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Brazil now has a president-elect who glorifies the military dictatorship and 
a general as vice president-elect; in Guatemala, officers made their menac-
ing presence felt as they literally stood behind the president as it was an-
nounced that the government would not renew the mandate of the Interna-
tional Commission against Impunity in Guatemala; and, Argentina intends 
to again use armed forces in conflicts within the country. In Latin Ameri-
ca, the military is once again openly intervening in politics. The continent 
seems to be on its way back to a past that many had thought overcome.
 • Although history seldom repeats itself and straight-out military regimes are 
unlikely, the continent is in a political crisis. The basic structural problems of 
violence, corruption, and inequality persist and continue to undermine demo-
cratic institutions.
 • The use of the military in crises is met with hardly any resistance, not only in 
defective democracies such as Guatemala or in authoritarian contexts such as 
Venezuela. In fact, surveys show that the military enjoys surprisingly high levels 
of trust throughout the entire region even despite past human rights violations.
 • The increasing violence against human rights activists is decreasing the room 
for manoeuvre of civil society actors, a group whom democratic societies need 
for stability and conflict management.
 • The coming into office of Donald Trump as president of the United States has 
buttressed right-wing authoritarian movements in Latin America. In that con-
text, as the military advances into politics it has nothing to fear from Washington.
Policy Implications
While international attention had been focusing on the return of authoritarian 
structures in Nicaragua and Venezuela for some time now, the election of far-
right, former reserve officer Jair Bolsonaro as president of Brazil shocked the 
continent. This is a dramatic wake-up call. Only if state and non-state actors 
support those political, economic, and social forces that defend democratic insti-
tutions can a new phase of political militarisation in Latin America be prevented. 
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The Unfulfilled Promises of Democratisation
The democratisation of Latin America over the past four decades had been accom-
panied with high hopes: stable civil institutions, regular elections, and respect for 
opposition and civil society organisations based on the rule of law. The political 
participation of hitherto marginalised populations – especially indigenous and 
Afro-Latin American groups – was to help redress the longstanding, deep-rooted 
problems of inequality and violence through democratic means. In the “lost decade” 
of the 1990s – marked by a debt crisis and failed adjustment programmes – the 
Latin American political systems passed their first acid test. In the new century, the 
region then elected governments during the so-called pink tide that promised more 
social justice without questioning the hard-fought fabric of democratic institutions. 
Latin America seemed on a promising path.
By the end of 2018, however, these positive developments seem to have come to 
an abrupt halt. The current crisis in the region reveals how democratically elected 
governments have failed to deliver in recent decades due to three structural and 
interlinked problems. First, they have not changed the resource-extraction model 
prevailing since colonial times, instead even strengthening it in the context of ris-
ing demand from China. Second, key pillars of democratic systems – rule of law and 
accountability (especially of elites) – have remained only poorly developed, which 
has in turn promoted corruption and impunity. Third, while the era of long-running 
wars has come to an end, overall violence has not decreased and instead merely 
shifted. Latin America remains the region with the highest levels of violence world-
wide, albeit with large subregional differences.
The inability to overcome deep-seated social inequalities has supported crime 
and violence. In the absence of outlooks for a legal future, more or less organised 
crime often provides marginalised populations with the only viable opportunity for 
economic survival and social advancement. Institutions – namely, the police and 
the judiciary – have not been in the position to fight crime effectively and with the 
rule of law. In that context, the attendant escalation of violence has paved the way 
for hard-line policies. This not only undermines basic democratic rights but legiti-
mises state violence against alleged criminals and, increasingly, against civil society 
representatives who peacefully campaign for political reform. The resulting threat 
to democracy, which is currently receiving widespread media attention with the 
case of Brazil, has been on the agenda throughout the region for some time now.
As early as the end of the Cold War, fundamental political reform had been re-
quested across Latin America. Figure 1 shows how the election of left-wing govern-
ments since 2005 – and the associated hopes for greater political participation and 
better living standards – initially led to a reduction in political protests. However, 
the high expectations of achieving a lasting reduction of violence and inequality 
through fundamental change have not been realised in many countries. As a result, 
there has been a dramatic increase in protests against political corruption and for 
more participation since 2014. 
At the latest since 2015, this societal mood change is also reflected in the elec-
tion of right-wing populist governments. The current president of Guatemala, Jim-
my morales, was for example elected with the slogan “neither corrupt nor a thief.” 
meanwhile, morales himself is suspected of having funded his election campaign 
with illegal donations. In Peru, Pedro Pablo Kuczynski only barely won the 2016 
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election against the daughter of ex-dictator Alberto Fujimori. In 2017 he had to 
resign, however, because his company had received illegal funds from the Brazilian 
construction company odebrecht in the years 2005 and 2006 (Heuser 2018).
The Military as Helper in Times of Need?
Corruption and crime are commonplace in many Latin American countries. Data 
of the Brazilian Igarapé Institute shows that 17 out of the 20 countries in the world 
with the highest homicide rate (murders per 100,000 inhabitants) are situated in 
the Americas. most affected are el Salvador, Jamaica, Venezuela, and Honduras, 
followed by Brazil, Guatemala, Colombia, and mexico (muggah and Tobón 2018). 
One-third of all murders worldwide are committed in Latin America and the Carib-
bean. The perception of pervasive insecurity in everyday life is also reflected in sur-
veys, and even affects those in countries with relatively little actual violence. For 
example, around two-thirds of the respondents usually state that they are often or 
always afraid of becoming victims of violent crime (Latinobarómetro 2017). This 
significantly influences who and by what means citizens hope to achieve an im-
provement in their living situation.
Throughout Latin America, a high level of distrust in traditional law enforce-
ment agencies has been evident for years. Surprisingly, this loss of trust does not 
apply to all security forces to the same extent. The population has little confidence 
in the police. Polls conducted by the AmericasBarometer show that trust in the mili-
tary – regardless of past military dictatorships – is significantly higher than it is in 
the local police (Figure 2). In particular in Central America, the “trust gap” between 
police and military has increased significantly over the past 10 years. This trend has 
also been observed in South America since 2014. In the context of far-reaching cor-
ruption and a lack of professionalism among the criminal-apprehending and inves-
tigative authorities, organised crime – driven by drug cartels and gangs – has been 
able to spread largely unimpeded. As a result, crime rates rose and distrust of the 
police significantly increased (Pion-Berlin and Carreras 2017).
This development has not remained without consequence. Throughout the re-
gion, there has been a marked shift in internal security away from the police and 
towards the military (Kyle and reiter 2018). In countries such as el Salvador, Gua-
temala, Honduras, and mexico, soldiers are now entrusted with safeguarding law 
and order. In 2018, Brazil also took this path when its military took control over 
Figure 1 
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Source: Authors’ own 
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on data from Clark and 
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the local police in certain parts of the country. even in Uruguay, widely regarded 
as a democratic and non-violent textbook model in Latin America, the military has 
joined the police in patrolling the borders it shares with Argentina and Brazil.
In the media, the use of soldiers to fight crime is often attributed to decisions made 
by political hardliners. especially in times of election campaigns, politicians seem 
inclined to sell a radical, uncompromising crackdown on crime and violence as a 
simple solution to complex problems. However, the sole focus on right-wing popu-
list politicians fails to recognise that the use of the military against criminal gangs 
is met with great approval by the population. Surveys by the AmericasBarometer 
show that in most Latin American countries more than two-thirds of the population 
support the internal use of the military (Figure 3). In countries with very high crime 
rates, such as el Salvador, Honduras, and mexico, this approval rate is even higher. 
This may also explain why the new president of mexico, Andrés manuel López ob-
rador, was able to promise a departure from the militarised security policy of his 
predecessors in his election campaign, yet renounced this undertaking before his 
inauguration in December 2018. even in Argentina, Chile, and Paraguay, where the 
population has suffered under repressive military dictatorships in the past, about 
half of interviewees are still in favor of internal military operations.
Figure 2 
Trust Gap between 
Military and Police in 
Latin America
Source: Authors’ own 
representation, based on 
data from the Ameri-
casBarometer (LAPOP 
2018).
Note: Dots depict 
countries and lines give 
trends.
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Source: Authors’ own 
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The approval of internal military operations is closely linked to the high prestige of 
the military apparatus. many citizens of Latin America see the military as a compe-
tent guarantor of security and stability, seemingly unfazed by or oblivious to past 
experiences with corrupt and violent dictatorships (Pion-Berlin and Carreras 2017). 
Data from the AmericasBarometer show that high levels of trust in the military go 
hand in hand with the desire to use the armed forces to curb crime and violence 
(Figure 4), whereby any possible negative consequences of such missions are ap-
parently seen as subordinate. Looking at the subcontinent as a whole, the approval 
rate for internal military operations is almost completely decoupled from citizens’ 
assessment of whether the military respects human rights. While this does not al-
low us to draw conclusions about the general importance of human rights in the 
region, it does underscore the pervasiveness of citizens’ fears of crime and violence. 
In other words, citizens appear to accept possible military assaults or human rights 
violations if this promises to reduce everyday crime and violence.
The Military as a Threat to Democratic Stability
The positive attitude harboured towards the military among large swathes of the 
Latin American population carries considerable risks. It can promote political ra-
tionales that undermine democracy and political participation. Internal military 
operations may promise security yet jeopardise core fundamental rights, such as 
freedom of expression and the rule of law. In addition, new studies agree that vio-
lent action by security agencies is in any case unlikely to curb criminal activity (Sul-
livan and o’Keeffe 2017). Accordingly, in Brazil the use of the military has not led to 
a noticeable reduction in crime (Stargardter 2018). Studies on other countries sug-
gest that “crackdowns” tend to contribute to an escalation and spiralling of violence 
between state and non-state actors (Condra and Shapiro 2012).
In Latin America, as in other regions of the world, the military is neither 
equipped for police duties nor are soldiers trained for police work (Pion-Berlin 
and Carreras 2017). The events in Brazil show how the use of soldiers to combat 
crime can lead to deadly confrontations with the civilian population (Human rights 
Watch 2018). Similar experiences have also been reported from mexico, where the 
armed forces are presently taking action against drug cartels (The Guardian 2017).
In addition, there is evidence that the use of the military is not limited to the 
fight against crime. In many countries, political violence is increasing against rep-
Figure 4 
Determinants of 
Internal Military 
Operations
Source: Authors’ own 
illustration, based on 
data from the Ameri-
casBarometer (LAPOP 
2018), survey wave 
2014.
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resentatives of civil society and social organisations as well as against independ-
ent judges, federal prosecutors, and journalists. Prominent examples include the 
murder of Honduran environmental activist Berta Cáceres in 2016 or city council 
member marielle Franco in rio de Janeiro in 2018. In addition there are many hu-
man rights defenders and activists who have lost their lives yet whose deaths have 
not been reported in the international media. In Colombia, more than 300 repre-
sentatives and activists of social movements have been killed since the signing of 
the peace agreement between the FArC (Fuerzas Armadas revolucionarias de Co-
lombia) and the government in 2016; the majority of these victims had been work-
ing to implement the agreement and its associated reforms. Violence is intended to 
intimidate beyond the realm of those directly affected; this massively restricts the 
scope for action of civil society actors.
moreover, the increased use of the military against mostly peaceful demonstra-
tors has also resurged in recent years. In Guatemala, in 2012, at least eight demon-
strators died from gunfire in protests against the increase in electricity prices. The 
democratisation process had originally seen the reform of state security forces – in-
cluding the clear separation of police and military mandates – in a number of coun-
tries. Yet in the context of fighting crime, this is now being softened or reversed in 
many places. In Guatemala, for example, the inadequate investigation of human 
rights crimes has bolstered a continuity of staffing in the military and police. even 
in countries like el Salvador, where a whole new civilian police force was created 
after the civil war, former military leaders were called on to assume key police posi-
tions. Alliances between politicians and members of the armed forces thus actively 
prevented far-reaching reform.
In this context, the poorer segments of the population as well as oppositional 
interest groups are particularly likely to become the target of state security bodies. 
In nicaragua, more than 300 people died from gunfire in recent demonstrations. 
In Brazil and Honduras, there has been an alarming increase in killings of human 
rights defenders in the last three years (Figure 5). Despite this development, the 
winner of the Brazilian presidential election, Jair Bolsonaro, promised the police 
and military a carte blanche for the use of deadly force in the fight against crime. It 
is safe to assume that this measure will incite violence against civil society actors 
and thus further undermine democratic institutions. While it is not always clear 
whether murders are committed by members of the military or the police, the crimi-
nalisation of social movements and their stigmatisation as “terrorists” – the term 
used by Bolsonaro for members of the landless movement in Brazil – creates a cli-
mate that justifies murder and further encourages such acts.
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Repression of Civil 
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Source: Authors’ own 
illustration, based on 
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Civil society groups contribute significantly to political reform and to the non-vio-
lent transformation of conflicts within democratic systems. especially where cor-
ruption and clientelism weaken political institutions, they point to grievances and 
articulate social interests. This allows, especially, marginalised groups to actively 
exercise their democratic rights. recent political developments – be it the violence 
committed by autocratic governments in nicaragua and Venezuela or the emer-
gence of right-wing populist, pro-military movements such as those in Brazil and 
Guatemala – give reason to fear the further shrinking of civic space, as well as an 
increase in state repression. This appears to augur a renewed erosion of democratic 
processes.
Global Tailwind for Authoritarian Behaviour
In the first decades of democratisation, many external actors – notable was the 
cooperation of the United States and the european Union – supported civil society 
actors and the consolidation of constitutional principles in Latin America. Between 
1980 and 2013, some USD 62.9 billion of official development aid went to govern-
ment and civil society there (AidData 2018). Brazil, as the only country in Latin 
America, became a strategic partner of Germany in 2008; the first governmental 
consultations between the respective cabinets took place in 2015. The oeCD ac-
cepted Colombia, as the third Latin American country after Chile and mexico, as a 
member nation in 2018. This international recognition was intended to contribute 
to the stabilisation of democracy and reform processes in the respective countries.
Despite these efforts – or because of the success thereof – Latin America has 
not figured prominently in German and european foreign policy. Instead, other 
crises – especially those in north Africa and the middle east – have dominated the 
foreign policy agendas of Western countries. However, this has had serious disad-
vantages for the most recent developments. For example, the weak rule of law has 
been acknowledged in many individual cases but not been recognised as a systemic 
problem at the international level until recently. The International Commission 
against Impunity in Guatemala, which has been active since 2007, is an example of 
the need for cooperation. It shows that where international support meets internal 
reform actors, cooperation can also be effective. resistance to similar projects in el 
Salvador and the currently limited scope for development in Honduras shows how 
difficult it is to implement such initiatives if international support does not join 
forces with local partners.
With the slowdown in international engagement, compounded by the shift oc-
curring in US foreign policy since Donald Trump took office, the implementation of 
any outstanding reforms is left up to local power relations – with the risk that said 
reforms will stagnate or even be reversed. This endangers past democratic achieve-
ments, and prevents the consolidation of democratisation.
The US government openly welcomes the rise of right-wing authoritarian 
movements and the increased influence of the military. national Security Adviser 
John Bolton declared Brazil’s election outcome a “good sign,” and Bolsonaro a 
“like-minded leader” (Gaouette 2018). Hence, the protection of civil society plays 
a subordinate role – if any at all. Ambivalent stances or the recognition of ille-
gal changes of government, such as the attempted coup against Hugo Chávez in 
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Venezuela in 2002 or the ousting of the Honduran president in 2009, weaken the 
regional sanctioning mechanisms of the oAS Inter-American Democratic Charter. 
moreover, such stances are risky and politically counterproductive, similar to the 
recent rumors or reflections on a possible military coup against the Venezuelan 
government. 
In order to avoid broad-scale setbacks for democracy, the region’s democratic 
forces need international support. Here europe and Germany have a decisive role to 
play. In terms of foreign policy, it is important to support governments that defend 
the institutional achievements of democratisation as well as to signal political sup-
port to an engaged civil society – and to protect its representatives. This also includes 
countering any authoritarian transgressions induced by those in power who – with 
the help of the military – are now calling into question the rights of certain groups 
or civil society actors. even though there will hardly be a return to the military 
governments of the past, the growing political role of the military is nevertheless 
endangering the already weak foundations of the Latin American democracies.
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